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Colombian policymakers dedicate little time and effort to international rela-
tions. For example, in the period from 1974 to 1977, international relations,
other than those pertaining to Andean Group negotiations, were never discussed
by the Council of Ministers nor the Council on Economic and Social Policy
(CONPES) (the two executive councils chaired by the President and which
meet regularly). This does not mean that Colombia did not have a foreign pol-
icy. During this period, the President and Minister of Foreign Relations were
closely involved in the Panama Canal negotiations and the nation signed various
treaties delimiting continental shelf boundaries with neighboring nations. But
decision-making was concentrated in the presidency and it was not felt neces-
sary to involve other agencies of the government.
In contrast, issues concerning Andean Group negotiations were often brought
to CONPES and sometimes to the Council of Ministers. In addition, the Con-
sejo de Comercio Exterior met often to discuss in detail negotiating options and
results. These meetings were attended by the Ministers of Development, Fi-
nance, Agriculture, and the heads of National Planning, the Central Bank, the
Coffee Federation, IFI (Instituto de Fomento Industrial, the Industrial Pro-
motion Institute), and Proexpo, the export promotion agency. In addition,
special ministerial level working sessions were organized to hammer out nego*
tiating strategies, and negotiating teams sent to Lima were often composed of
technicians from the Ministries of Development (represented by personnel from
INCOMEX, the Institute for Foreign Trade), Finance, IFI, and the National
Planning Department.
In summary, this shows that Colombian policymakers have in the past viewed
Andean Group decisions as important, and that such decisions affect the prin-
cipal sectors of the economy, as represented by the economic ministries, in addi-
tion to the Foreign Ministry.COLOMBIA AND ANDEAN GROUP 183
The attention given to the Andean Group by decisionmakers, is to some
extent surprising, since as will be shown in this paper, the Andean Group has
not affected such economic variables as trade, foreign investment, or indus-
trialization in any perceptible ways. The foregoing does not mean, however,
that time and effort expended on Andean Group issues by Colombian policy-
makers has been misspent or wasted.
A good case can be made for the proposition that the impact of the Andean
Group on the Colombian economy will only show up in the long run, and that
the amount of attention received by Andean Group affairs simply shows the
interest Colombian policymakers have in long-term issues. This is, in itself, an
interesting fact given the short tenure (usually less than 3 years) of ministers
and a four-year presidential term. The attention given by policymakers to this
and other long-term issues is, in some respects, surprising but it may largely
explain the apparent continuity in economic policymaking in Colombia.
The imperceptible short-term effects of the Andean Group on economic
variables may, however, lead to premature disappointment with the whole
process. It may be that this phase began in 1980. For that reason, it is important
to review the different mechanisms of Andean integration and to try to evalu-
ate the impact of the different aspects of this process up to 1980, and the
changes that the decisions now in force can have on the future shape of the
Colombian economy.
Furthermore, the process of decisionmaking in Colombia with respect to the
Andean Group may serve to illustrate the way economic policymaking is con-
ducted, and how different interest groups influence such policies. This analysis
can also suggest how the Colombian position vis-a-vis the Andean Group may
evolve in the future.
THE TRADE LIBERALIZATION PROGRAM
The Andean Group seeks to become a full-fledged customs union. The major
policy objective of a customs union is trade liberalization between member
countries, within a common external tariff. The Andean Group has made prog-
ress in trade liberalization, but by 1980 it had only adopted a common mini-
mum external tariff.
Recent research carried out at a leading private research institute (FEDE-
SARROLLO) shows, interestingly, that the liberalization program has, in fact,
had very little influence on Colombian trade [3]. This contradicts a study by
the Junta of the Acuerdo de Cartagena, as well as the commonly held view
among Colombia's Andean partners. This mistaken view stems from a super-
ficial reading of the rapid growth of Colombian exports to Andean countries,
without taking into account the increase in Colombian exports to third coun-
tries. Luis Jorge Garay analyzed export growth at a very disaggregated level,
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and compared export performance before and after 1970 (when intragroup
trade liberalization began), and contrasted the dynamics of trade with Andean
countries with respect to that with Central America and the Caribbean, or
that with the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). His conclusion
was that trade liberalization has not changed the flow of commerce of Colombia
with its Andean partners. Since these results are at variance with those assumed
by many policymakers in the region, they are worth summarizing.
In the first place, it should be mentioned that Colombian exports to the
Andean countries grew more slowly, or at best, no faster than those to third
countries during the first six years of trade liberalization. This contrasts with a
greater than average growth at the end of the sixties for exports to the Andean
nations, prior to liberalization among Andean Group members.
Furthermore, there are no significant variations in the intersectorial structure
of trade with the Andean Group between 1966-70 and 1971-76. This again sug-
gests no effect of the integration effort on industrial or trade structure. In addi-
tion, Colombian regional exports do not appear to be less concentrated than
those to third countries, thus suggesting that the integration process has not
created important markets for new exports. Although it is true that the number
of items exported to the Andean Group did grow more rapidly, the foregoing
result suggests that the economic importance of this phenomenon (in value
terms) was insignificant.
The picture does not improve when we examine exports or imports included
in the lists where tariff advantages were available. Only 48 percent of Colom-
bian exports (in value terms) benefited from some type of Andean tariff prefer-
ence, as opposed to 78 percent of Colombian imports from other Andean
Group countries. Furthermore, trade in the items receiving preferential treat-
ment did not grow faster after the preferences came into effect.
A justification often given for economic integration is that regional markets
may serve as an export "platform" in the sense that when entrepreneurs learn
to export even small quantities to neighbors who provide preferences, they can
subsequently launch export drives to third countries. But if we examine the
lag between exports to Andean countries and to other markets, the conclusion
is that there is no evidence that exports occur first to the regional markets where
preferences are available. It does appear that for Andean exports, there is a
tendency to use the neighboring Venezuelan or Ecuadorian markets as export
platforms, as shown by a lag between exports of various items to the Chilean,
Peruvian, and Bolivian markets relative to those made to Ecuador and Vene-
zuela. On the other hand, there is evidence that Colombia's imports from
Andean Group members do displace imports that previously came from third
countries.COLOMBIA AND ANDEAN GROUP 185
Finally, Garay concludes that his various results suggest that there were no
significant effects of trade creation or trade diversion in Colombia attributable
to the Andean Group during the first six years of its existence.
The foregoing observations, however, do not mean that trade with the
Andean Group is unimportant for Colombia. The region receives 25 percent
of Colombian exports (excluding coffee) and contributes 7.5 percent of the
nation's imports. Furthermore, 42 percent of intermediate goods and metal
and machinery goods exports go to the member countries, and 40 percent of
processed food imports come from the region.
From this set of results, it is tempting to conclude that the importance of the
region for sophisticated Colombian exports created support for Colombian
promotion and participation in the Andean Group, but that in the short run
the group's mechanisms have not had the expected effect. However, the in-
teresting question is: what was the constituency within Colombia that expected
tangible results from integration? It can be safely said that many politicians and
policymakers were bullish about the Andean Group, and were convinced that
integration would contribute to industrial growth, particularly since it could
make available the benefits of economies of scale. Integration was also attrac-
tive as a means of obtaining more independence from Colombia's major trad-
ing partners (the developed countries), and from the vicissitudes of commodity
markets. In addition, the sector of the Liberal Party that was identified with
the creation of the Andean Group (the Llerista faction led by former President
Carlos Lleras Restrepo, 1966-70) presented the Andean Group as a major
policy innovation and had exaggerated the benefits of such a scheme.
Interestingly enough, both orthodox theory and ECLA (the Economic Com-
mission for Latin America) did not place much emphasis on trade liberaliza-
tion between underdeveloped countries. Orthodox theory predicted few
benefits, since little trade creation is expected primarily among economies which
are not complementary. Most of the member countries had similar industries
at low levels of technological advance, and agricultural goods were not gen-
erally given trade benefits. ECLA, on the other hand, postulated that a liberal-
ization of regional trade would not achieve the transformation of the economic
structures in the member countries. For that reason ECLA recommended the
programming of industry by sectors, and a substantial amount of planning at
the regional level to achieve real integration.
It could be argued, however, that the propagandizers of economic integra-
tion did not often spell out the limited effects such efforts would have in the
short and medium run. On the contrary, integration was often recommended as
the solution which might get the Latin-American economies back on the path
of accelerated industrialization. Therefore, the enthusiasm of politicians and
policymakers for the Andean Group is understandable.186 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND PRIVATE INTERESTS
As Guillermo Perry has shown in his recent survey of Colombia's exchange
and foreign trade policies [5] the tariff structure has been fairly constant since
the 1930s, and those industries which obtained high protection at the start of
industrialization are the ones that by 1980 still had the highest levels of pro-
tection. He furthermore concluded that there was a close relationship between
levels of protection and growth of industry by sector, a result which implies
that tariff structure does affect profits and industrial structure.
The constancy of the tariff structure suggests that there are powerful in-
terests which make rationalization of tariffs difficult. Throughout the 1960s,
agricultural interests were conscious that high protection to consumer-good in-
dustries discriminated against agriculture, and since 1967 most economists have
recommended lowering protection levels of traditional industries, since one
cannot justify infant industry protection for industries which have had it for
more than 30 years. Additionally, the attack on protection was spearheaded by
Alfonso Lopez, an influential political figure throughout the 1960s, and effec-
tively propagandized by his close associate Indalecio Lievano. This outlook en-
joyed powerful support when in 1974 Alfonso Lopez became President and
Indalecio Lievano was named Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Despite the apparent political and economic strength of the forces opposing
protection, the tariff structure did not change significantly during the 1960s or
even after 1974, although the government attempted at various times to ra-
tionalize the protective structure.
The impression one receives is that in the Colombian system substantial op-
position can be mobilized to oppose concrete measures that harm a specific
interest group that is already strong. For example, the Lopez government was
unable to eliminate the virtually infinite protection for textiles through import
quotas due to the effective opposition of the interested parties, often working
with the middle echelons of the bureaucracy. Nevertheless, there was no effec-
tive opposition to the Development Plan, which sought to restructure protec-
tion. A national plan, however, has no immediate effects until implemented.
The plan was not attacked for its antiimport substitution bias, partly because
rural and agricultural interests are quite strong in Congress. Most active
politicians liked the strategy presented in the plan.
The exception was a group of politicians from Antioquia ( a province where
industrialization started and where the industries that were originally protected
were located), where everything the Lopez administration did was considered
harmful. Not only was the general economic policy of the government per-
ceived as prejudicial to the industries in the region, but the very progressive
tax reform passed in the first 100 days of the administration made the powerful
industrial and cattle groups of Antioquia hostile. In other areas, such as the
province of Valle, national industry was less protected and agricultural groupsCOLOMBIA AND ANDEAN GROUP 187
did not find the Lopez economic philosophy unattractive. In the rural areas of
the coast, the tax bite was compensated by the increased administrative re-
sponsibility given the costenos, less emphasis on land reform, and a government
committed to promoting development in that region. But the political and
economic coalition in Antioquia, supported by ANDI based in Antioquia and
dominated by the liberal Antioquefio industry, made the political cost of dis-
mantling protection too high. For the Liberal Party losing electoral support in
Antioquia is a serious matter. Furthermore, it can be argued that in Antioquia,
where the Liberal Party was traditionally more identified with the urban
economic elite than in other areas, the political class could turn against the
progressive Lopez government. In summary, the industrialists, supported by
ANDI and given strength by the anti-Lopez political coalition in Antioquia,
were able to forestall a change in traditional protectionist policies.
The foregoing suggests that tariffs in Colombia are an area of policy where
the stakes are high. It is not surprising, therefore, that policy with respect to
the Andean Group became, from 1968—80, a high priority for successive ad-
ministrations, since most Andean Group decisions in some way affect the levels
of protection.
The effect of the Andean Group on Colombia's economy has not been large
up to now, because the minimum external tariff adopted by the group is very
similar to that existing in Colombia. Furthermore, since most imports from
the member countries using the group's tariff preferences are natural resource-
based goods,
2 the Andean Group has not yet created additional competition for
local producers. After 1980, progress which is made within Andean Group
mechanisms will, however, imply changes in the structure of protection.
INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN COLOMBIAN ECONOMIC POLICY
AND REGIONAL IMPORT SUBSTITUTION
The philosophy behind the Andean Pact was developed at the end of the
1960s, when the import substitution strategy so widely employed in Latin
America was no longer producing clear benefits, and various Latin-American
leaders decided that only by extending import substitution to a regional level
could the industrialization momentum be kept alive.
Garay analyzes the ECLA theory on economic integration in detail [4] and
ex-president Carlos Lleras, although refusing to give CEPAL paternity for the
idea, confirms that the founders of the Andean Group thought its main pur-
pose was to make regional import substitution viable [7, p. 249]. Ex-president
Lleras is careful to point out, however, that:
Colombia adopted the Grupo Andino idea that within this arrangement a greater
degree of competition for the benefit of consumers be achieved in those sectors not
the object of special programming commitments, giving importance to the preference
margin implicit in a customs union but without thinking that that margin can or188 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
should be maintained at levels which will promote at the sub-regional scale the most
obvious distortions that national protection has caused in those cases in which it has
been maintained for a longer time than is reasonable. [6, p. 4]
This quote by one of the founders of the Andean Group clearly shows that in
Colombia in 1979 (and probably in 1968), even the most interested partisans
of the Andean Group cannot subscribe to an extreme import substitution theory
of integration. President Lleras clearly supports the pact by conviction but also
because it is one of the major achievements of his administration. The other
major achievement of the Lleras administration was the foreign exchange and
trade regime established in 1967 (Decree Law 444), in which Colombia began
in earnest an export-promotion development strategy. For that reason, President
Lleras implicitly suggested that the Common External Tariff should be lower
than the present level of the national tariffs.
The attitude of the Venezuelan and Peruvian governments, and that of
Chile before Pinochet, was quite different. Peru and Chile were not particularly
interested in trade liberalization, but were ideologically committed to industrial
programming and to preventing the market from determining industrial struc-
ture.
3 Venezuela, on the other hand, had made the commitment to "sow its
petroleum." This meant investing revenues from oil in industry so that when
petroleum reserves were exhausted, the country would have an industrial base
to sustain its economic growth. Venezuela therefore emphasized the program-
ming aspects of the Andean Group during the initial negotiations, since it
wanted to invest in capital-intensive industries which needed a regional market
to attain economies of scale. Regional programming opened up this possibility
because the other countries did not have the capital to carry out the investments
this strategy required. Bolivia and Ecuador also supported industrial program-
ming, hoping through that mechanism to create capital and technology-inten-
sive industries.
In the first years of the pact, the emphasis in negotiations was therefore on
industrial programming and regional import substitution. The tendency was
toward a level of protection of the Common External Tariff above the levels of
the Colombian tariff, and toward a degree of state intervention in the economy
that was not considered practical or desirable by Colombian policymakers. The
latter therefore saw the Andean Group as a threat. They felt that unless progress
was kept at a very low rate, decisions concerning the Andean Group would
contradict the main lines of Colombian development policy.
The Colombian attitude toward the Andean Group has not been constant.
In the years following a serious exchange crisis of 1966-67, trade policy had
elements of protectionism and import substitution that seemed to dominate
the export promotion efforts. Decree Law 444 of 1967 represented a turning
point. Nominally, it was very protectionist, as most imports either required spe-
cial licenses or were prohibited, and strict exchange controls were established.COLOMBIA AND ANDEAN GROUP 189
At the time import substitution strategies were also being stressed for the auto-
mobile and petrochemical industries. In those years the import substitution
strategy of the Andean Group coincided with what appeared to be economic
policies prevalent in Colombia. In that early period, which included the
negotiation of the Acuerdo de Cartagena, Colombia's active support for inte-
gration reflected the apparent lack of contradiction between the philosophy of
regional import substitution and internal economic policy.
Actual economic policy between 1967 and 1970, however, did not follow
the protectionist rhetoric of Decree Law 444, or of the older generation of
ministers who took that rhetoric seriously. President Lleras took the initiative
to devalue in real terms through a crawling peg system, substantial support was
given to agriculture and exports, and the first steps were taken toward liberal-
ization of the financial system. By 1970 Colombia had opened its economy to a
surprising degree, and few people in or out of government wanted to return to
import substitution. With a lag, INCOMEX negotiators began to take tougher
stands in Lima. Accordingly, Colombia found itself in disagreement with most
of the protectionist positions taken by the Junta, Peru, and Venezuela in the
period 1974-78.
While in Colombia the main thrust of policy after 1970 was to downplay
import substitution, there were different currents in Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Bolivia. Whereas in Venezuela, Chile, and Peru state participation in industrial
projects was becoming more important, in Colombia there was widespread dis-
appointment with industries which had been promoted by the state development
bank (IFI), and little inclination to foster a greater relative role for the state in
industry.
It is therefore evident that one of the four main postulates of Andean inte-
gration was not very attractive to Colombia. The Junta of the Andean Group
saw that the first postulate on which there appeared to be agreement when
the Acuerdo de Cartagena was formed was that
to the state there corresponds a decisive role in the general conduct of the process of
development, a role more important than that traditionally recognized. This role is
to be expressed through planning and direct investment in some strategic sectors.
[7, p. 244]
In Colombia there was support for only a very mild version of this postulate,
in which more planning only meant the rationalization of public investment.
The contradictions between the development strategies of Colombia and its
partners have been mentioned because at the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena,
at the Foreign Offices of the other countries, and in much of the literature,
it has generally been thought that Colombia was the country that could always
be counted on to support the Andean Group, since regional integration would
clearly be beneficial to it. For example, to Colombian policymakers the matrix
published by Tironi on degrees of support by country to the various integration190 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
mechanisms was very surprising. Colombia appears (see the table) in favor of
all mechanisms, while in reality it rejected consistently both programming
(PSDI) and the high level of common tariffs (AEC) proposed by the Junta.
Although one could argue with some of the non-Colombian rows in the
matrix, for example by underlining PSDI for Venezuela and probably for
Ecuador and Bolivia, it is clear that the image of Colombian support is mis-
leading. First, one should underline the trade liberalization column for Colom-
bia and change PSDI to rejection or doubt both on economic and ideological
grounds. Decision 24 could be characterized by D (Doubt) instead of A (Sup-
port) when that letter denotes indifference or nondogmatic support. It is im-
portant to emphasize that within Colombia and even in government circles
concerned with Andean Group negotiations, support has not been as widespread
as is thought by the other member countries. Probably a good explanation for
this situation can be found in the Garay study, which shows that through the
1970s trade liberalization had not had any perceptible benefits for Colombia.
Since PSDI (industrial programming) is considered undesirable in Colombia
for economic as well as ideological reasons, the less-than-enthusiastic support is
understandable. The Garay results are also confirmed by the fact that private
industry has shown little interest in getting involved in Andean Group issues.
For example, Luis Prieto, an ex-president of ANDI, told me that except for
one decision (Decision 24) industrialists showed no interest in Andean Group
negotiations.
The attitude of Colombian policymakers to the Andean Group must also
be viewed in the light of developments in the Colombian economy in the 1970s.
First, one must take into account that both informed opinion and the economic
literature seem to agree that the gradual opening up of the economy since 1967,
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Symbols: A»support; D-doubt; R=rejection. Subscript e is for economic reasons while sub-
script i is for ideological reasons. Underlining of a symbol means that this item has the
highest priority for the country in its development strategy.COLOMBIA AND ANDEAN GROUP 191
and the shift from a mild import substitution to a mild export promotion
strategy, made possible a significant acceleration of economic growth. In other
words, except perhaps in the area of inflation, the Colombian economy has
been performing well and it is clear that protectionism would not affect prices
in the right direction. Therefore, Colombian policymakers have been and are
reluctant to let the Andean Pact emphasis on high tariffs and regional import
substitution bring about a change in what appears to be a successful growth
strategy.
The Colombian model has performed well in terms of GNP growth, and it
has also solved some of the more serious unemployment problems envisaged in
1967. Furthermore, a good case can be made for the proposition that income
distribution in Colombia became less equal in periods of substantial import sub-
stitution (see [7]), and that the bias against agriculture in most of the proposals
of the Junta del Acuerdo de Cartagena tends to decrease, in relative terms, the
share of the rural population in total income, a result which clearly harms the
poorest sectors of society. Given the problems which a return to greater pro-
tectionism could cause, the economic benefits from trade liberalization would
have to be very large in order to obtain serious support for the Andean Group
in Colombia.
The only constituency for the ECLA integration model would be among in-
dustrialists. But industrial programming decisions cover industries to be estab-
lished, while the intragroup liberalization of trade does not benefit the tradi-
tional industries in the textile and consumer goods sectors, since these items
•were excluded by most countries from the list of goods that would receive
tariff preferences. Only capital-intensive state enterprises and multinationals
could possibly get involved in large investment projects. Neither is popular
in Colombia, or capable of mobilizing politically relevant groups in their favor.
If lack of support for the Andean Group by important interest groups is so
prevalent, it is interesting to consider why Colombia did not leave it. There are
probably four reasons.
(1) As mentioned earlier, growth of trade with the Andean countries was
substantial before 1970. Although the Andean Group has not resulted in sig-
nificant expansion of such trade, leaving the group could be harmful. Trade
is not negligible; in particular, exports of certain technologically advanced
goods is important.
(2) Within the Colombian political structure factions of both the Liberal and
Conservative parties have a programmatic commitment to the maintenance of
the Andean Group. The creation of the group was one of the major achieve-
ments of the Lleras administration, and the first years of life of the Acuerdo
are considered a triumph of the Pastrana administration. This makes leaving
the Andean Group a difficult partisan issue with a political cost. Paralysis of
progress in the negotiations between member countries, however, has little cost.192 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
(3) Since Colombia has boundary problems with Venezuela, leaving the pact
has a cost in terms of Colombia's major foreign policy problem: relations with
Venezuela.
(4) There is a certain ideological commitment on the part of intellectuals
and policymakers to the idea of becoming less dependent on trade with the
developed world. This, and the idea of a greater unity among Latin-American
countries, has substantial power for mobilizing support for the Acuerdo. One
must remember that Colombia has little interest in broader foreign affairs, since
it can have little influence on what happens in the world. In these circum-
stances, economic integration seems to be the only foreign policy option.
Some comments on the relative strength of these four reasons may be useful.
The influence of firms exporting at present to the Andean Group is limited by
the fact that a not insignificant amount of manufactured goods exports are
made by foreign firms.
4 These companies find it difficult to influence Colombian
government policy.
The importance of the political factor should not be ignored. However, de-
velopments since 1970 have weakened the weight of the Lleras faction in the
Liberal Party, and since the Andean Group is identified with Ex-president
Lleras, due to the dominance of the anti-Lleras groups within the Liberal
Party, the commitment to integration of the majority political party is not as
strong as it could be.
The argument concerning relations with Venezuela is crucial, but support
of the Andean Group for ideological reasons is a consideration which must
also be taken into account by policymakers. The benefits of economic integra-
tion have been so propagandized by its partisans that any break with the Andean
Group would require a very active campaign of explanation.
5 On the other
hand, the issues being negotiated are so complicated that a standstill in integra-
tion is much easier than a break. Furthermore, as the economic process of inte-
gation has come to a standstill, the member countries have found that a com-
mon Andean Group position has some impact on Latin-American affairs. Al-
though it is hard to see how such a common position can be translated into
concrete benefits for Colombia,
6 the newfound importance of foreign policy
acting through the Andean Group is an additional incentive for policymakers in
government to make sacrifices in order to keep Colombia in the pact.
It is ironic that the Andean Group started to develop a common foreign policy
only when it became obvious that integration could only have a marginal eco-
nomic effect. As in the case of Latin-American governments, there is a negative
correlation between internal economic success and foreign policy activity.
COLOMBIA: THE GAULLIST MEMBER
The foregoing analysis suggests that Colombia would follow a policy of hin-
dering the progress of the Andean Group mechanisms, particularly after theCOLOMBIA AND ANDEAN GROUP 193
original promoters of the idea left government. Until then policymakers who
helped create the Acuerdo could only find their political stature diminished if
the pact were to fail, and they were willing, therefore, in negotiation, to sacri-
fice some Colombian interests because it was clear the costs would only appear
in the long run. With time, however, the Colombian export-oriented model
became more successful, and the older import substitution strategy became less
and less popular, even in its regional version. Furthermore, political power
seemed to shift within the majority Liberal Party away from proindustry to pro-
agriculture politicians. Furthermore, the 1960s school of Colombian economists
who started being active in government in the 1970s were also quite anti-ECLA.
All of this made Colombian growth strategy more and more incompatible with
the import substitution and proindustry bias of the Andean Group as reflected
in its charter, in the philosophy of the Junta staff, headquartered in Lima, and
in the role Peru and Venezuela envisaged for the group.
The result was that Colombia supported the trade liberalization scheme,
which coincided with its export promotion efforts, but tried very hard to avoid
decisions leading to greater protection through changes in the Common Tariff
or ambitious industrial programs coordinated for the region as a whole.
Industrial programming in particular seemed dangerous to policymakers.
First, it implied high tariffs for the products negotiated, and second, there was
no assurance that Colombia would be able to produce the goods assigned to it
under the negotiations. It appeared that only capital-surplus Venezuela could
make all the investments assigned to it in an ambitious industrial program, and
that in many of the capital-intensive industries programmed, only transnational
corporations or the government could mobilize the investment capital. Since
the Colombian government had no surplus funds, many social programs to
finance, and had shown itself to be an inefficient industrial entrepreneur, it was
not logical to support industrial programming. The exception was automobile
programming, since the government was already heavily involved in the indus-
try, and there it was felt that any rationalization would improve productivity.
7
It is telling, however, that programming should make significant progress only
in areas where state intervention is strong in Colombia, such as automobiles and
petrochemicals. In all other industrial areas, the state plays a limited role rela-
tive to other large Latin-American nations, and one would therefore expect
Colombia to be reluctant to allow progress in the industrial programming
effort.
In summary, Colombian policymakers dedicated much time and effort to
the shaping of policy with respect to the Andean Group, primarily to prevent
the dynamics of integration from modifying the implicit economic strategy put
in place after 1967. Both industrial and agricultural interests support that
strategy, and have done well with it. Organized urban labor, which has done
less well in the 1970s, on the other hand, saw no particular advantage in, or
even understood fully, the integration issues. Therefore, the programming194 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
mechanisms which were so important to Venezuela, Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Allende's Chile, had few friends in Colombia. Thus Colombia later found
itself often in accord in the Andean Group with Chile under Pinochet, since
Chile then wanted to downplay programming and protectionism.
THE EFFECT OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS IN INTEGRATION POLICY
General analysis, however, should never ignore personalities. Jorge Valencia
Jaramillo, President Lleras's representative in the original negotiations of the
Andean Pact, was the minister in charge of Andean Group at the start of the
subsequent Pastrana administration. For personal political reasons he was in-
terested in having the pact survive, and therefore was more willing to compro-
mise than his successors, a crucial fact given the importance of the decisions
taken in the first years of life of the Acuerdo. Also, during the second half
of the Lopez administration (1976-78) Antonio Urdinola was one of the few
economists in government who did not believe in freeing trade and who favored
greater public investment in industry, a view that had some influence on the
negotiating position of Colombia in the Andean Group. In a sense it is inevitable
that prointegration people should staff the agency in charge of Andean negoti-
ations, since such an attitude makes Colombian foreign relations less difficult
and also makes partisans of integration appear to be successful negotiators. For
example, Urdinola's predecessor had reflected Colombian opposition to the pact
too bluntly, and this complicated presidential foreign policy in other areas
considered important.
8
The institutional framework for policymaking has also had an effect on
policy outcomes. The establishment of a decision-making board (the Junta)
with permanent country representatives meant that, in each of the countries
concerned, a specific government entity separate from the two traditionally
strong ministries of foreign relations and finance was given the coordinating
and negotiating role for Andean Group affairs. The result was that the agency
in charge of integration had a vested interest in avoiding any breakdown in the
process.
In Colombia the decision was taken to centralize integration coordination in
the Consejo de Comercio Exterior (Council on Foreign Trade), which is in
fact the Board of Directors of INCOMEX, the import control agency admin-
istratively dependent on the Ministry of Development. This agency was created
to control imports at the time of the exchange crisis of the mid-1960s. By 1970
Colombia had more foreign exchange, and the import rationing function of
INCOMEX was no longer very important. In those circumstances, its role in
the Andean Pact negotiations became the major justification for its continued
existence. Therefore INCOMEX employees were very prointegration.
Since the agency's other function is import control, it is structurally biased
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tionist bias is reflected even in the sources of income of INCOMEX, which
receives no budget money to finance its operations. It depends exclusively on a
fee charged on the sale of documents required to obtain import licenses. Since
export promotion is the function of another autonomous agency (PROEXPO),
there are within INCOMEX no bureaucratic divisions dedicated to export
promotion or trade liberalization. In addition, INCOMEX seldom reports to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and deals mostly with the Ministry of Develops
ment. The latter is the most protectionist Ministry in Colombia, and the place
industrialists take their complaints concerning "unfair" competition.
In summary, the institution in charge of Andean Group negotiations would
lose all importance, which is substantial at present, if "integration" is not pur-
sued actively. It is not surprising, then, that the INCOMEX staff is more pro-
integration than any other sector of the bureaucracy. This has had two effects.
On the one hand, it has made negotiators from this agency willing to compro-
mise in order to avoid a crisis in the Andean Group, and on the other hand, it
has led negotiators from the other countries, whose main contact is INCOMEX,
to think Colombians have a greater interest in the Andean Group than is in
fact the case.
In the same way that other member countries, through their contacts with
INCOMEX, have been misled into believing that Colombia supports the
Andean Group more than it in fact does, Colombian negotiators (as well as the
author) may have taken too seriously the Peruvian and Venezuelian support for
high protection levels and industrial programming. While the Secretaria de
Integracion of Peru took strong positions in favor of high tariffs and program-
ming, other agencies in that country may have had more liberal policies. In
Venezuela, the Ministry of Finance, continually trying to control inflation, was
much less protectionist than those in charge of integration policy. In other
words, if similar studies were carried out in the other countries of the region,
they would probably also show a pattern of support for the different instruments
of integration that is somewhat different from that which appears in official
pronouncements. Such studies would probably show greater similarities than are
implicit in the official negotiating positions, particularly after recent shifts in
economic policy in Peru. In that case, the possibilities for progress in the process
of integration would be greater than in the 1974—78 period.
CONCLUSION
The Andean Group model of economic integration presupposes an enhanced
role for the state and planning activities. The major purpose of integration is to
achieve industrialization through import substitution at the region level. Both
of these postulates imply a reform of the economic model followed by Colombia
with success since 1967. Therefore Colombia could not legally support ac-
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costs of leaving the Andean Group were not negligible. This logically led to a
policy of delaying decisions in areas which went against the interests of the
country, particularly in industrial programming and a common (and high)
external tariff.
The lack of short-term benefits from trade liberalization also made policy-
makers increasingly reluctant to compromise on tariffs or industrial program-
ming (PSDI) in return for continued progress or the maintenance of trade
liberalization. Furthermore, the limited opportunities for exports created by
the Acuerdo account for the fact that no important national group has been
mobilized in its support.
The failure of the Peruvian experiment and of some of the Venezuelan
publicly owned industries have led to shifts in economic policy in these coun-
tries in the direction of the Colombian position. In the future, Peru and Vene-
zuela may put less emphasis on industrial programming and on a high common
external tariff to promote regional import substitution.
9 One would thus expect
greater progress towards a customs union in the near future.
With respect to the decision process in Colombia the conclusions suggested by
this case study are:
(1) Specific interest groups, such as the industrialists in ANDI, have the
power to avoid changes in policy which affect their interests in a significant
way, particularly if they manage to obtain regional political backing for their
position. This suggests that special interests with a regional label can be quite
influential in policymaking. These interest groups, however, cannot initiate
policy.
(2) Individual government policymakers have substantial "initiative space."
If the initiative does not produce a veto from an important interest group,
it will probably be implemented. The veto, however, will only be effective
against an earnest executive when the interest group can translate its opposition
into political opposition from some group of one of the two traditional political
parties, the Liberals and Conservatives.
(3) There is a substantial current of feeling against state industries and pub-
lic investment in productive enterprises in Colombia.
The first proposition can be derived by analyzing the role of the National
Industrial Federation (ANDI) in Andean Group decisionmaking. Although
the protectionist strategy of the Acuerdo de Cartagena should be attractive for
industrialists, ANDI never mobilized effective support for the Junta's tariff
proposals. On the other hand, ANDI has been able to block government at-
tempts to lower tariffs, and its veto in this area has been made possible by
identifying its position with that of the Antioquia region. A showdown with
respect to tariffs would therefore involve the government in a serious political
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The second proposition can be derived by observing the amount of influence
individual policymakers have had on policy. A minister can initiate policy
without consulting the political parties, the interest groups, or his cabinet col-
leagues.
1
0 If there is no substantial opposition, he can pursue his policy by
administrative means, even if he has little support from the parties, or Congress.
Jorge Valencia Jaramillo was, therefore, able to make substantial commitments
for Colombia, which will affect future trade and industrial structure, even if
these commitments would not have obtained majority support of his cabinet
colleagues or of Congress. When he proposed policies which would affect spe-
cific private interests or basic principles in a very direct way, he was defeated.
This was the case when he committed Colombia to more state industry in the
negotiations concerning Decision 24, or when he ran into frontal conflict with
the construction interests over his proposed urban reform.
In this case study the large "policy space" of an individual policymaker is
illustrated by the change in trade policy brought about by Antonio Urdinola in
1976-78. With support from the Minister of Development, he downplayed the
opening up of the economy favored by the President and some of his ministers.
He was able to do this because no single measure he took hurt the agricul-
tural partisans of lower protection, but he did get support from the industrialists
and the Andean Group negotiators.
1
1
The third proposition can be derived from various parts of the story pre-
sented here. For example, although ANDI had an interest in promoting the
Andean Group proindustry and protectionist policy, it did not actively support
the Andean Group because the philosophy of the Junta implied a greater de-
gree of government intervention than deemed acceptable in Colombia. The
detailed planning involved in industrial programming could only diminish the
freedom of action of private industry. ANDI's opposition to Decision 24 also
concentrated on eliminating the clause that gave government the first option
to the stock of foreign companies that divested. ANDI, in fact, supported the
divesting clause. There has been little support for industrial programming also
due to the awareness that such a policy can be effective only with a massive
increase in public investment in industry.
NOTES
* This paper was prepared while I was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Inter-
national Center for Scholars of the Smithsonian Institute.
1. In most of the paper, analysis is carried out for at least 76 export items and 104
import items.
2. [3], p. 7. Garay, after reclassifying slightly processed industrial goods as belong-
ing to the agricultural or mining sector, concludes that 58 percent of Colombia's
imports from the Andean Group are resource-based.
3. Personal interview with Francisco Thoumi, the negotiator for Colombia of the
minimum external tariff, relates that at the end of the Frei government, Chilean198 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
tariff ranged from 0 to 10,000 percent, and that the first proposal of the Chilean
delegation for the minimum tariff was a 300 percent average level, with a range from
0 to 10,000 percent.
4. In a sample of firms that export to the Andean Group carried out by CEPAL,
the percentage of total exports covered by foreign-owned firms was somewhat higher
than 50 percent. See [2].
5. It is interesting to note that in principle most newspapers and commentators are
for integration. One can think of no public figure with on-the-record opinions against
integration.
6. Venezuela and Ecuador can derive clear benefits by acting through the Andean
Pact, since this counteracts the negative reactions for the US and other Latin-Ameri-
can nations generated by the OPEC affiliation of these countries. The recent US-
Andean Pact agreement gave Ecuador and Venezuela access to the US generalized
tariff preferences which had previously (1975-79) been denied to OPEC members
by the Trade Act. On the other hand, Colombia's support of the Nicaraguan insur-
gents through the Andean Group was altered into a sea platform-border problem insti-
gated by the new government. Furthermore, Peru voted against the Colombian can-
didacy for the Security Council at the UN and in favor of Cuba.
7. It is interesting that according to Luis Prieto, ex-president of ANDI, the only
private sector interest in the Andean Group was shown by the only private automaker.
That company clearly felt that in negotiations for the automotive program in the
Andean Group it would probably lose out to the two government-supported auto-
makers. The government automakers, on the other hand, were represented by IFI,
which believed in industrial planning, and therefore liked the scheme of the Andean
Group.
8. The other delegations went to the extreme of letting the Colombian government
know that they would not go to the sessions of the Junta which would have to be
chaired by Alberto Galeano. Thus a veto occurred of a Colombian chief negotiator
who was following instructions, although perhaps with less diplomacy than desirable.
Personalizing the conflict was useful, since Colombia then named Urdinola, who was
more protectionist than the rest of the government.
9. Venezuela's balance of payments and government finance problems also makes
less interesting the strategy of investment in government-owned and capital-intensive
import-substituting industries.
10. This same aspect has been documented by Bruce Bagley in his case studies on
decision-making. See [1].
11. Antonio Urdinola, who kindly read this paper and made perceptive comments
which will be extremely useful for a more complete analysis of the way pressure
groups operate in Colombia, commented that within the Andean Group his negotiating
position was made easier by the fact that his colleagues were aware that he had a
more proindustry and protectionist position than most of the people in the government
he represented. Clearly Antonio Urdinola influenced negotiating results by giv-
ing greater weight to his own ideological viewpoint, but being both a very able nego-
tiator and very knowledgeable about the Colombian economy, the fundamental eco-
nomic model of Colombia was probably very effectively defended by him.
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Comment on "Colombia and the Andean Group"
John Williamson
PUC — Rio de Janeiro
My comments on this informative and interesting paper are directed toward
two topics. First, I provide an evaluation of the analysis that underlies Urrutia's
assertion that Colombia has not benefited from its membership of the Andean
Group. Second, I relate the paper to the long-running debate on the merits of
economic integration programs between developing countries.
As Urrutia indicates, his conclusions about the negligible benefits that Co-
lombia has so far reaped from its membership of the Andean Group are based
on the research of Luis Jorge Garay [1], a colleague of his at Fedesarrollo. He
was kind enough to send me a copy of this paper, which I read with interest. I
am not, however, convinced that the statistical analysis of that paper justifies
such strong conclusions as Urrutia has drawn. Let me explain why.
The main measure used in the analysis is the acceleration in the rate of
growth of exports, disaggregated by product and market. It was found that this
acceleration was not in general greater for intra-Andean trade than for Colom-
bian trade with other parts of the world, so that the proportion of Colombian
noncoffee exports destined for partner countries remained at much the same
level (some 25 percent) at the end as at the beginning of the period under
study (having fallen in the interim and then recovered). The shortcoming in
this analysis is that it fails to allow for changes in the relative size of the various
markets. Constancy in the proportion of exports destined for partner coun-200 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
tries may be consistent with sizable effects of integration in stimulating trade,
if it happens that the markets in those partner countries have been growing
more slowly than those in other countries. In recognition of this fact, economists
who have estimated the effects of trade liberalization
1 have developed a variety
of alternative methods of normalizing for changes in the size of markets. Since
the main measure of integration effects used in this study
2 did not use any of
these normalizations, one is not in my judgment justified in drawing any strong
inferences from the results. I concede that one can accept the results as
evidence that the Andean Group has not had any dramatic positive impact on
Colombian exports comparable with that of the EEC on the trade of its original
six members, but not as evidence that there has been no worthwhile stimulating
effect.
In fact, there are three snippets of information in the study that suggest that
the trade effects of integration may have been positive.
(1) The proportion of Colombian imports from partner countries did in
fact rise modestly, from 5.6 percent to 7.4 percent. This is more significant than
the constancy in the distribution of exports, given that the correction for differ-
ing growth in market sizes is not necessary on the import side.
(2) There is fairly clear evidence of trade expansion in metallurgical prod-
ucts. Some 42 percent of Colombian exports in this sector are destined for
partner countries, and there is clear evidence that exports of new products
in this sector occur first, or indeed only, to other members of the Andean
Group. This is surely significant so far as metallurgical products are precisely
the type of product that was not extensively produced in the area in the past,
and whose production and trade the group was intended to promote.
(3) The Balassa-type analysis also undertaken by Luis Garay found evidence
of trade creation in four, and of trade diversion in three, of the 21 product
groups examined. (Balassa's method does, of course, make an appropriate
allowance for relative changes in market size.) Given the very partial nature
of integration in the Andean area to date, with most agricultural and consumer
goods excluded in principle and few programming agreements concluded, it
is not obvious that this result is derisorily low.
Nothing I have said should be construed as claiming that the integration
effort of the Andean Group has been a major success, or as challenging Ur-
rutia's denial that any benefits to Colombia have been more than marginal
(as is apparently believed by its partners). But I hope that my remarks will
caution against jumping to the opposite conclusion that the Andean Group
has been a demonstrable failure.
Let me now turn to my second topic, the role of trade integration between
groups of developing countries. I am moved to take up this subject because of a
dissatisfaction with the existing literature. Some of the reasons that have been
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attempts strike me as quite fanciful — the lack of currency convertibility, rivers
that flow the wrong way, cantankerous politicians. I intend to argue that those
difficulties are, on the contrary, a direct and inevitable result of the nature of
the exercise in question, and can be understood as such in terms of the most
basic concepts of customs union theory, trade creation, and trade diversion.
An increase in exports to a partner country in a customs union is always bene-
ficial to the exporter. In a classical full-employment fixed-resources model, the
benefit takes the form of a terms-of-trade gain. In a Keynesian variable-em-
ployment fixed-resources model, there will be an additional gain in terms of
increased output. In a developmental variable-employment variable-resources
context, there may be yet a further gain through the establishment of a viable
infant industry in the exporting country. Note that even if the goods cost more
to produce than their value on the world market, the act of exporting still
benefits the exporter, since it is the importer who pays the excess.
An increase in imports from a partner country brings a long-run benefit to
the importer if the trade was "created," albeit generally with some accompany-
ing short-run adjustment cost. The situation is the opposite when the new
imports represent trade diversion: there is no adjustment cost, but imports
are permanently more expensive. The importer therefore suffers a long-run
loss from trade diversion. So, on classical full-employment fixed-resources as-
sumptions, does the world as a whole, though not necessarily, if there is a
possibility of improving the terms of trade, the union as a whole.
These basic analytical facts are consistent with the experiences of the EEC.
The expansion of intratrade in industrial products consisted predominantly of
creation rather than diversion, thus both exporter and importer gained. More-
over, since member countries already possessed comprehensive industrial estab-
lishments, trade expansion was predominantly iniraindustry — which mini-
mizes the pain of adjustment. Ergo, there were no net losers, and the customs
union met general acclaim. The story has of course been very different with
regard to agricultural trade, in substantial part because trade has in this case
been predominantly diverted rather than created.
Contrast this with the situation in the Andean Group. The object of Andean
integration is, as Urrutia has said, the promotion of import substitution at the
regional level. Now import substitution at the national level is the exact opposite
of trade creation — one might even term it "trade destruction." Correspond-
ingly, import substitution at the regional level gives rise to trade diversion —
the replacement of low-cost imports from third countries by high-cost imports
from partner countries. This diversion may, on nonclassical assumptions, bring
benefits to the union as a whole — whether or not it does so is the familiar in-
fant industry question. The crucial point is that all the benefits (indeed, more
than the total net benefits) accrue to the particular country where the new
industry is located, while the importing countries face a net cost when the union202 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
succeeds in doing what it was intended to do. It is misguided to lament the
fact that customs unions between developing countries divert trade — that is
their purpose. But it is also naive to "reject" customs union theory as irrelevant
on account of that fact; the theory tells us that the importing countries will
lose, and that fact is of vital importance.
For it is surely a fact (and one to which Urrutia's paper is indeed eloquent
testimony) that countries will cooperate in integration efforts only if they ex-
pect to benefit in consequence. Since a union intended to promote import sub-
stitution will harm its members to the extent that they import more from their
partners and benefit them only to the extent that they export more, it has to en-
sure a balanced distribution of new industries between the member countries if
each of those members is to gain from their participation. Hence the imperative
of industrial programming in such unions. Urrutia has now pointed out yet one
more possible obstacle to successful establishment of an import-substituting
union: the possibility that some members may lack either the desire or the
capacity (or both) to accept programmed industries, but rather seek the
chance for their unprogrammed industries to compete. Furthermore, when
integration is seeking trade diversion to support the establishment of new in-
dustries, the chances are that the new industries will prefer to concentrate geo-
graphically, since this typically yields certain economies — albeit sufficiently
modest economies as not to prejudice the emergence of intraindustry specializa-
tion in a union between countries which already possess a full slate of estab-
lished industries. Once again, a union aiming to promote import substitution
is more likely to lose that balance of advantage between its members that is
essential to its success.
Does this imply that developing countries would be well advised to abandon
attempts at regional economic integration? Not necessarily. The case for such
integration is one degree stronger than the case for infant-industry protection,
since any given level of infant-industry protection will be that much more
effective and less costly (for the union as a whole) than it would be if under-
taken solely on the basis of individual national markets. While I would be the
last to wish "extreme" import substitution policies on anyone, I believe that
continuing modest pressure to push forward the margin of import substitution
constitutes part of a rational development strategy. Hence I wish integration
efforts like the Andean Group well. The burden of my preceding analysis is not
that they are undesirable or irrational, but that there are very basic economic
factors which make their success inherently more difficult than analogous move-
ments between developed countries. Success will demand a higher order of
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NOTES
1. See, for example, the survey of the approaches developed up to 1970 in [2],
2. The study does contain an indirect method of testing for the effects of differen-
tial market growth, involving a regression of the acceleration in export growth of dif-
ferent products on (inter alia) the weighted growth of export markets. However, this
seems to me so indirect as to be of questionable value.
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